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Private Information and 
Endogenous Entry 
Juan Carlos Bárcena-Ruiz and Jesús Rubio* 
We assume an organiza디on made up of a princlpaJ and an 
agent in which the agent privately observes the state of nature 
The agent can use his private information to set up a new firm 
(endogenous entryl with a posltive fixed cost. We show that. in 
equilibrium. there is effective endogenous entry if 야le cost of 
enσy the agent must bear to establish a new firm is low 
enough. as the agent has better information about the state of 
nature than the principaJ. 
Keyωords: Endogenous entry. Private Information 
JE,[, Class띠cation: L2. L22. D82 
I. Introduction 
In the literature on entry deterrence, the possibility of deterring 
the entry of potential rivals has rn밍nly been studied by assurning 
that rivals come from outside the firm (see. for example. Gilbelt 
(1 989)). In this paper a diff농rent type of entry is considered: 
endogenous entry; that is , the entrant comes from inside the fim l. 
πle problem facing the owner of a firm (the principall is that 
production requires a second individual (the agentl 밍ld， over 디me. 
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this individual will acquire private information about the firm and 
hence the ability to leave 때d set up a rival firm. 
The literature on endogenous entry deterrence shows that the 
princip떠 C밍1 deter endogenous enσy， for example, by investing in 
capi떠1 before contracting with the agent (Stewart 1994) or by 
controlling the information the agent can get inside the org밍liza디on 
(Bárcena-Ruiz and Rubio 2000). On the other hand , Pakes and 
Nitzan (1 983) 킹1d Rubio (1996) show that there c밍1 be endogenous 
entry if the principal does not know the cost of set디ng Up a new 
firm by 야1e agent. However, in many cases both the principal and 
the agent know the cost of establishing a new firm , but the agent 
has better information on the environment than the principal. This 
private informa디on， which is usu외ly obtaïned by the agent after 
working for several years for the principal, can be used by the 
agent to set up a new firm. 
The fi이10삐ng e짧mple illustrates the problem we want to 
consider (El Pafs , 2-25-1996). Lázaro Ituarte was a firm located in 
Amurrio (Basque Country) , founded in the 1930s, that found a 
stronger 디val in the 1980s in a firm created by the ex chairman of 
the company. This person left the firm , together wi삼1 a group of 
lower level managers , and set up a 디val company: HT Fluid 
Control. Lazaro Ituarte went into a crisis after the group of 
managers left. Although the sales of this firm were around 9 
million euros. and two thirds of its output was sold abroad. it 
could not avoid going into receivership in 1992. 
We consider a static model that ref1ects the example cited. There 
is an organization made up of a princip려 (the owner) and an agent 
(the manager). Only the agent obseπes the state of nature; the 
principal has pπOr beliefs conceming the state of nature. The 
princip려 offers a contract to the agent, who is able to break the 
contract without pen떠디es and set up a new firm with a posi디ve 
flxed cost; in that case. the old firm disappears. We show that. in 
equilibrium, there is endogenous entry if the cost of entry the 
agent must bear to establish a new firm is low enou!강1. In this 
case. the agent can set up a new firm since he has better 
information about the state of nature than the principal. The agent 
knows the true value of the new firm while the princip려 values the 
firm in expected terms and thus in order to deter entry the 
princip머 has to pay a quan디앙 greater than the expected profit she 
would obtain by deterring endogenous entry. 
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If the firm of the principal does not disappear in case of entry by 
the agent. there are two firms compe디ng in the product market. In 
this case. there is endogenous entry for a lower value of the cost of 
entry the agent must bear to establish a new firm than when the 
firm of the principal disappears in case of entry since market 
compe디Uon implìes that the outside option of the agent has a 
lower vallue. Moreover. if market compe디tion is sufficiently strong in 
case of entry by the agent. it is not profitable for him to set up a 
new firm. 
In seetion II we provide the model. Section III shows and 
discusses the results. Section rv extends the model to consider 
competition in the product market and. finally. section rv draws 
conclusions. 
11. The Model 
We focus on an organization that consists of a principal and an 
agent. both risk neutral. The principal hires an agent who exerts 
unobsenrable effort eε 10.el/ l to obtain an observable output χε 
10.지11. There are two states of nature: the good state. θ'1/. and the 
bad state. θL. Prior beliefs concerning the state of nature θ든{ θ'1/ .1서， 
which are common knowledge. are 81/ with probability q and θL 
with probability (l -q). Only the agent is able to observe the true 
state of nature. 
The probability of obtaining XI/ depends on both the effort of the 
agent and the state of nature. We assume that if the agent exerts 
a high level of effort. eH. when he observes state of nature. θ. the 
probability of obtaining X I/ is k 1 (i=H.L). k; ε[0.1 ]， where k l/ >kL. In 
the case of low effort. e二 O. it is not possible to obtain X I/. 
Therefore. we assume that the agent’s effort. the probability of 
observing the state of nature by the agent and the state of nature 
generate the following probability structure: 
P(xl/ l 81/.ell) = kll. 
P(xII18L.e/I l 二 kL • 
P(XII/θ.e=Oloc=O. 8EI8u.8d. 
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The agent can observe the state of nature because he is an 
experienced manager. However. the principal is not an expeπ in 
using the information aVailable about the state of nature (i.e. she is 
not an experienced manager). The princip외 is an investor that it is 
not able to manage the firm and. thus. he needs to hire a m밍lager 
(the agent) to do this work. 
The agent can break the contract he has signed. without 
penal디es. after observing the state of nature. This is 삼le same as 
assuming that he c밍1 observe the state of nature before signing 
the contract. 1 This assump디on seeks to model the fact that some 
managers. after working several years in a firm. leave and set up a 
new rival firm that competes with the old one. 
There is a fixed cost C which can be understood as the expected 
cost of conσacting a team of workers to exert a productive effort. 
This cost is the wage of the team of workers and thus is a cost 
that must be paid by firms to be able to produce. This cost is the 
same regardless of whether the firm is established by the principal 
or by the agent. In order to simplify the model. and without loss of 
generality. we consider this fixed cost instead of inσoducing a third 
individual (or a team of workers) in the organiza디on. 
If the agent establishes a new firm. he must pay a fixed entry 
cost F. In order to simplify the exposi디on of the results. we assume 
that the agent can set up a new firm only if he observes the good 
state of nature. 2 In the case of the setting up of a new firm. the 
princip외 cannot operate in the market since we assume that there 
is a natural monopoly. If the agent sets up a new firm. he will be 
both the owner 없ld the manager of the firm. 
The reservation u디lity level of the agent is denoted as ι. and 
depends on the value of his outside option. when this value is 
positive. If it is not profitable for the agent to set up a new firm. 
his reservation u디lity level is normalized to zero. The prinCipal’S 
utili양 function is X -S(X) 一C. The agent’s utility function. if he 
accepts the offer made by the princip외 is Sκ)-e. where -e is the 
lIf the agent observes the state of nature after signing the contract the 
principal must pro띠de incentives for the agent not to break the contract 
after obseπing the state of nature. Otherwise. the contract would not 
gu하밍1tee that the agent will stay in the firm of the p디ncip려 after 
observing 야le state of nature. 
2It can be shown that the main result of the model holds if the agent 
can 머so set up a new firm in the bad state of nature. 
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level of disu디lity given by the effort; if the agent sets up a new 
firm , he himself exerts effort 킹ld， thus , his utility function is x-e 
-C-F. 
We assume that the expected income derived from the effort 
made by the agent is greater than the cost of this effort, k !.Xll>el/. 
This assump디on ensures that the expected utility of the principal 
is always posi디ve (never positive) when the agent exerts high (low) 
effort. In lhis way we can ignore the problem of how much effort to 
choose when sol띠ng the problem ()f the principal , as the laUer will 
always want the agent to exert high effort. 
The timing of the model is the following: (i) the agent observ원 
the true state of nature; (ii) 야le princip머 designs 야le agent’s 
incentive scheme , s(x), where s(x/l) =Sll and s(이 二 SL;3 (iii) the agent 
observes lhe incentive scheme and decides whether to accept the 
offer made by the p디ncipal. reject it. or reject it by setting up a 
new firm; (iv) the agent exerts effort eE(O.ell}: and (v) the outcome 
is obtained and payments are made. The equilibrium concept used 
is the Bayesian Perfect Equilibrium. 
111. Results 
Let V denote the principal's expected u디lity: V=q[kuxIJ -kllSll 
(1 -kf/ )sL] 키 (l-q)[k!.XH-kLSII-(l-krJsL] -C. The principal’s problem 
lies in choosing S 1/ and SL. to maximize V. which is subject to th건 
following constraints. 
First. as the agent privately observes the state of nature. there 
are two paπicipa디on constraints. The agent must receive at least 
his reservation u디lity level in both states of nature to accept the 
contract. 
해'e assume that it is far too expensive to design separa디ng contracts. If 
it were possible. the princip외 could obtain the information about the stat.e 
of nature. Demski 와ld Sappin!안on ‘1987) ar망le that it is not always 
possible fo :r the agent to disclose his information. Only the agent is an 
expeπ in using the information available to observe the state of nature. 
They also :표gue that the information that the agent holds privately is not 
always comrnunicated to the principal since the skill and training necessary 
to use the information (i.e. to observe the state of nature) have a great cost 
For instance. a divisional manager holds information valuable to the 
division 없ld this information is not given to the head of the firm. 
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kHSH + (1 - kH)SL -eH는딛， (1) 
kLSH+ (I -kùsL-eH 는 O. (2) 
Seco띠ly， the agent exerts hi방1 effort if his expected u디lity in 
this case is hi방ler than if he were to exert low effoπ; in the laUer 
case, he would obtaïn a low salary. As 야le agent observes the state 
of nature before exerting 단le effort, there are two incentive 
constraints , 
}디]SH + (1 - kH)SL - ell는 SL， (3) 
kLSll+(!-kL)sL-eH 는 Sv (4) 
Finally, the agent cannot be fined since incentive schemes for 
m밍lagers do not usua1ly include fines (see Jensen 없ld Murphy 
(1 990)) , 
SL 르 O. (5) 
We must now obtain the reservation utility level of the agent, 끄 
If the agent sets up a new firm , which can only happen if he 
observes 8H. he himself exerts the effort. He then gets: kHxH -eH-C 
-F. and his reservation utili낀 level is U=max{O ， kl싸J -ell-C -1'1. 
Therefore , it is profitable for the agent to set up a new firm 
(endogenous entry) if the cost of entry, F , is low enough; i.e when 
F<k샤XH -eH -C. Let L1k = kll - kL which can be interpreted as 야le 
increase in the probability of obtaining Xll when the agent observes 
the good state of nature , 811. In this case , the agent obtains all the 
income due to the increase in produc디띠ty when he p디vately 
obseπes the good state of nature , L1kxH , and the income generated 
by his effort, kLXH. But he must pay the cost of his effort, eH. and 
the fixed costs C and F. If F는 kHXH -ell-C, the agent will never set 
up a new firm since he will not obtain posi디ve expected profits; in 
this case his reservation u디lity level is normalized to zero. 
If we denote L1s = SH - SL and Fl = k，샤XH -eH -C , we can write the 
principal’s problem as: 
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Max V= I(kL +q L1k:)(Xl/ - L1s) -SL -C) 
Sl/,SL 
subject to: (1) k/JL1s+sL--el/는 max(O，F1 -1'1 
(2) kL L1s + SL --ell 르 O 
(3) k rJ L1s -el/ 르 O 
(4) kL L1s -eH 르 O 
(5) SL 는 O 
As constraint (3) is redundant due to (4). we have two cases 
depending on the value of the flxed cost of entry , F. 
깐le first case occurs when the value of F is high enou맹.F므 jT1 • 
the agent will never set up a new flrm since he cannot expect 
positive profits and , thus , 딛=max(O，F1 -1'1 二 O. Constraints (2) a r1d 
(4) hold with equ외ity， implying that SL=O and s l/=ell/kL. 까len ， \/= 
(kL+q L1k]I((xll-(el/ /kù) -C. 밍1d 야1e agent obtains (L1k/ kJel/ when he 
observes ell and 0 when he observes θ'L. Therefore , under θ'11 the 
agent gets (L1k/ kJerr , the informational rent that he obtains by 
observing the good state of nature. 
The second case occurs when the value of F is low enough. F'< 
Fl , and then U二max(O，F1 -F1 =F1 -F. In this case, under ell , the 
agent gets maxl( L1k/때efl，F1 -Fl; i.e. he gets 밍1 informational rent 
or the value of his outside option. Let F2 = kllxn -eH -C - (L1k/ kJ션11. 
We have two possibili디es. First. if F is such that F2드F<Fl ， then 
maxl(L1k/kJell ,F 1 -1'1 = (L1k/kJen and the agent does not set up a 
new firm since he is be1ter off with the informational rent. 
Constraints (2) 없ld (4) hold with equ머ity. implying 야1at SL二 o and 
SII'=ell/kL: then , V=(kL +q L1k)(xw- (eu/kJ). the agent obtains (L1k/ .I<:J 
ell under θ'11 and 0 under eL. Second, if F<F2. then maxl( L1k/ kLleIl. 
Fl -F)=F1 -F and the agent obtains a higher income by set디ng 냐P 
a new firm. Because of this , the principal will have to pay him the 
same income he would obtain if he established a new firm. 
Constraints (1) 밍ld (4) hold with equality. impl꺼ng that SL = 0 and 
Srr=XII • (F + C) / k ll . and the principal gets V = (kL + q L1k)((F + C) / k ll) -- C 
,= [F( kL +q L1k) - (1 -q) L1kC]/kIl; therefore. V<O if F< ((l -q) L1kC)/(kL + 
q L1k)=F3. As a result, if F<F3 , the principal cannot deter 
endogenous entry since she would obtain nega디ve expected profits. 
If F3~F<F2 ， the principal deters endogenous entry' and the agent 
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obtains F1-F in the good state of nature and kL xlI -ell-(kdF+ 
C) / (kL + q L1k)) in the bad state of nature. 
We can summarize the above results in the following proposition. 
Proposition 1 
When the agent observes the good state of nature. qH. in 
equilibrium there is endogenous entIy if F<F3; it is not profitable 
for the agent to set up a new firm if F르F3. In this last case. 삼le 
agent gets the value of his outside option if F2 > F三 F3 and an 
informational rent if F는F2 • 
When the fixed cost of entry is high enough. F는F2 • there is no 
endogenous entIy. In this case entIy is blockaded since the 
principal’s behavior is not affected by 앙le possibility of endogenous 
entIy. If F는F2 • 야le agent prefers to work for the principal when the 
agent observes 8H. and get an informational rent by privately 
observing the state of nature. It must be noted that if F는 Fl (being 
Fl > F2). the agent c밍mot get a posi디ve utility by setting up a new 
firm. 
Nor is there endogenous entry when the fixed cost of entIy takes 
an intermediate value. F2 > F는 F3 .. In this case. 야le principal has to 
pay the agent the value of his outside option. which is greater than 
the informational rent. Thus. the p디ncipal is able to deter 
endogenous entry. 
Finally. when the fixed cost of entry is low enough. F<F3. the 
p디ncipal cannot deter endogenous entry since she would obtain 
nega디ve expected profits. As the agent knows the σue value of the 
new firm while 야le principal values the firm in expected terms in 
order to deter entIy. the principal would have to pay a quan디ty 
greater than the expected profit she would obtain by deterring 
entIγ. 
IV. Competition in the Product Market 
In this section we extend the model to consider the case in 
which the firm of the principal does not disappear in case of entry 
by the agent. In this case market structure is a duopoly instead a 
monopoly. The Xp 와ld XA denote the incomes of the firms of the 
principal and the agent. respectively. As compe디디on decreases the 
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rents to b‘~ divided between the principal and the agent, XI/ >XP+XA 
(i.e. the rents in a duopoly are lower than in a monopoly). The 
values of xp and XA could arise from different types of compe디디on. 
We could have Cournot compe디디on on quanti디es if firms choose 
their output levels simultaneously. We could also consider that 
either of 1he firms has an advantage which would permit its to 
become a Stackelberg leader on quanti디es. For instance. the agent 
could have an adv없ltage and choose quantities first (and thus be 
the leader) since the most skil1ed workers of the principal’s firm 
have left and now work for the agent. Similarly. the principal could 
be the leader since its firm was in the market first. 
In 삼1is case. the reservation utility level of the agent is ι; 
maxIO.kI/XA-ell- F}. Therefore. it is profitable for the agent to set up 
a new firm if F<k/lXA-el/ -C. Given that market competition implie5ò 
that XA <XI/. under a duopoly market structure the outside option 0:: 
the agent has a lower value than under a natural monopoly (i. e 
the profits of the firms are lower if market structure is a duopoly 
rather than a monopoly). πlis means that the payment that the 
principal has to give to the agent to avoid endogenous entηr is 
lower when there 1s competi디on in the product market. As a result , 
market competi디on reduces the range of values of parameter F for 
whiCh there is endogenous entry.4 Moreover , if market competition 
is sufficiently strong (i.e. if X/I is sufficiently greater than XA) in case 
of entry by the agent. he does not find it profitable to set up εt 
new firm since the value of his outs1de op디on 1s lower 삼lan the 
informational rent he obtains by working for the principal. 
V. Conclusion 
In this paper we consider the possibili양 of deterring entry by the 
principal when the agent has better information on the environment 
(state of nature) than the p디ncipal. This private information can be 
used by 1he agent to set up a new firm. The principal offers a 
contract to the agent. but the agent is able to break the contract 
without p앙nal디es and set up a new firm with a posi디ve ftxed cost. 
80 that the old firm disappears. We show that, in equilibrium. 
there is endogenous entrγ if the cost of entry the agent must bear 
~e proof is available from the authors on reques t. 
500 SEOUL JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS 
to establish a new firm is low enou맹. The agent will set up a new 
firm since he knows the true value of the new frrm while the 
principal values the firm in expected terms. 
If there is compe디tion in the product market. Le. if the firm of 
the principal does not disappear in case of entry by the agent. 
there is endogenous entry for a lower value of the cost of entry the 
agent must bear to establish a new firm than when the firm of the 
princip외 disappears in case of entry since market competi디on 
implies that the outside op디on of the agent has a lower value. 
(Received 18 October 2002; Revised 21 July 2004) 
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